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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
In this consolidated action, appellants Jose Casiano and 
Alfredo DeJesus, each of whom pled guilty to both 
carjacking and kidnapping, appeal from the application of 
the twenty-year enhancement mandated by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1) for a second or subsequent conviction for using 
a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. They contend 
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that despite the literal language of the statute, the 
enhancement is not applicable if the second conviction 
arises from the same criminal episode and involves the 
same victim as the first conviction. Casiano appeals his 
firearms conviction, arguing that he is not liable under the 
standard enunciated in Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 
501 (1995), for the "use and carrying" of a firearm under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Casiano and DeJesus also contest the 
district court's rulings on their respective motions for 
downward departures. We have jurisdiction of these 
appeals, which we had consolidated under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
 
I. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On July 6, 1995, after a binge of snorting heroin and 
angel dust lasting approximately six hours, Jose Casiano, 
Alfredo DeJesus, and Jose Cantero, a fifteen-year old 
juvenile, left the house of Casiano's cousin in Philadelphia 
and began walking back to their homes in Camden. Both 
Cantero and DeJesus were carrying .380 automatic pistols. 
One of the three suggested that they steal a car. At 
approximately 10:00 p.m., they saw Father Marc Shinn, a 
Russian Orthodox priest, getting out of his Dodge van. 
DeJesus approached Father Shinn, hit him in the head 
with the butt of the gun and forced him into the back of the 
van. Father Shinn was then forced at gunpoint to lie in the 
back of the van, where Cantero sat on his back, covered his 
head with a blanket, and held a gun to his head. With 
DeJesus driving, they drove the van back to Camden. 
 
Father Shinn told the men he was a priest; one of them 
answered, "We don't fucking care if you are a fucking 
priest." During the forty-five minutes in which Father Shinn 
was held captive in the back of the van, Cantero straddled 
him, simulating anal sex, and repeatedly pistol-whipped 
and threatened him. Father Shinn lost consciousness 
several times. His captors stated that because Father Shinn 
had seen DeJesus's face, he would have to be killed, and 
they openly discussed how and where they would kill him. 
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They stopped the van when they reached a remote 
location in Camden. Casiano and Cantero forced Father 
Shinn out of the van without his shoes or glasses, and 
Cantero then forced him to walk at gunpoint through a 
ditch of water approximately one foot deep and through a 
grassy field, pushed him to the ground and fired twice at 
his back. One shot narrowly missed Father Shinn's head, 
and the other shot hit him in the back. Father Shinn 
feigned death. Cantero returned to the van, shouting"I 
shot, I shot," and the three assailants drove away, leaving 
Father Shinn lying on the ground. 
 
The bullet actually went through Father Shinn's 
shoulder, he was not critically injured, and he managed to 
get help. A short time later, one of the paramedics who 
assisted Father Shinn and his partner recognized the van 
from the description given by Father Shinn. He called the 
police, and the three perpetrators were apprehended while 
sitting in the van outside a bar. The police also found four 
firearms in the van -- the two .380 pistols, one sawed-off 
shotgun, and one .38 revolver, all loaded with live 
ammunition. 
 
DeJesus and Casiano were indicted on August 3, 1995 by 
a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. Cantero was indicted separately. This court 
upheld the district court's order granting the government's 
motion to try him as an adult. See United States v. J.C., No. 
95-1809 (3d Cir. May 24, 1996). 
 
Both DeJesus and Casiano were charged with one count 
of conspiracy to commit carjacking and kidnapping in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, one count of carjacking in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, one count of kidnapping in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1), and two counts of using 
a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Casiano entered a guilty plea, pursuant 
to a plea agreement, to all counts on October 23, 1995. 
DeJesus entered an open guilty plea to all counts on 
December 22, 1995. 
 
The district court sentenced Casiano to 188 months 
imprisonment on the conspiracy, carjacking and 
kidnapping counts to run concurrently. In addition, the 
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court sentenced him to an additional 60 months for the use 
of a firearm in relation to the carjacking pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), to run consecutively to the substantive 
counts. The court then imposed an additional sentence of 
240 months imprisonment for the use of a firearm in 
relation to the kidnapping and, pursuant to the same 
statute, imposed that sentence to run consecutively. The 
total imprisonment for Casiano thus was 488 months. 
 
DeJesus was sentenced to 70 months imprisonment on 
the conspiracy, carjacking and kidnapping counts to run 
concurrently to each other, and an additional 60 months 
for the first violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), to run 
consecutively, and 240 months for the second violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), to run consecutively. 
 
The principal challenge raised by both Casiano and 
DeJesus on appeal is to the application of § 924(c)(1) to the 
second offense, which added an additional twenty years 
imprisonment to their sentences. 
 
II. 
 
CHALLENGES TO SENTENCES UNDER § 924(c)(1) 
 
A. 
 
The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
      Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of 
     violence . . . uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition 
     to the punishment provided for such crime of violence 
     . . . be sentenced to imprisonment for five years . . . . 
     In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under 
     this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to 
     imprisonment for twenty years . . . . Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, the court shall not place on 
     probation or suspend the sentence of any person 
     convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the 
     term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection 
     run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment 
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     including that imposed for the crime of violence . .. in 
     which the firearm was used or carried. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
 
Appellants Casiano and DeJesus argue that because the 
criminal course of conduct from the carjacking (the first 
predicate offense) to the kidnapping (the second predicate 
offense) was continuous and involved only one victim, the 
district court erred as a matter of law in applying § 924(c)(1) 
to use of a handgun in connection with the kidnapping as 
"a second or subsequent conviction." However, they point to 
nothing in the language of the statute to support their 
statutory construction and our searching inquiry has 
uncovered no support for their position. The statute speaks 
in terms of "conviction," not criminal episode. This textual 
approach to § 924(c)(1) is compelled by the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of that statutory provision in Deal v. United 
States, 508 U.S. 129, 113 S.Ct. 1993 (1993). 
 
Deal, who had committed six armed robberies at different 
banks on different dates within a four-month period, was 
charged in one indictment with, inter alia, six bank 
robberies and six counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1). Upon Deal's conviction on all charges, he was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment on the first § 924(c)(1) 
count and to twenty years on each of the five other 
§ 924(c)(1) counts, each term to run consecutively. The 
issue before the Supreme Court was "whether [Deal's] 
second through sixth convictions under § 924(c)(1) in [a] 
single proceeding arose `[i]n the case of his second or 
subsequent conviction' within the meaning of § 924(c)(1)." 
Id. at 131. 
 
The Court rejected Deal's argument that because 
"conviction" could mean either the finding of guilt or the 
entry of a final judgment of guilt, § 924(c)(1) should be 
limited to the latter under the rule of lenity. Under Deal's 
construction, the "second or subsequent conviction" as 
used in § 924(c)(1) would have had to occur in a separate 
adjudication. Justice Scalia parsed the text of the statute 
and concluded that the only coherent reading of the 
language was that the word "conviction" used there referred 
to a finding of guilt, and not to a final judgment, id. at 132, 
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and that because "findings of guilt on several counts are 
necessarily arrived at successively in time," id. at 133 n.1, 
a finding of guilt on each count after the first was "second 
or subsequent," id.. 
 
The dissent in Deal argued that "subsequent conviction" 
as used in § 924(c)(1) "clearly is intended to refer to a 
conviction for an offense committed after an earlier 
conviction has become final; it is, in short, a recidivist 
provision." Id. at 141-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Inasmuch 
as that argument was expressly rejected by the Deal 
majority, Casiano and DeJesus do not repeat it here. 
Instead, they contend that § 924(c)(1) was never intended to 
punish subsequent convictions arising out of a single 
criminal enterprise involving the same victim. They attempt 
to distinguish Deal because it involved six separate and 
distinct robberies, which were committed over a period of 
four months at six different Houston area banks and 
necessarily involved numerous victims. They note that Deal 
and the opinions of the courts of appeals subsequent to 
Deal are silent as to whether multiple § 924(c)(1) offenses 
under these facts can constitute "second or subsequent" 
convictions. They argue that therefore we should conclude 
that the twenty-year enhancement under § 924(c)(1) does 
not reach them. 
 
This court has not yet been faced with this precise 
factual scenario. Nonetheless, the language and reasoning 
of Deal ineluctably require rejection of this argument. In 
order to adopt defendants' argument, we would have to 
limit the statutory language "second or subsequent 
conviction" to exclude a conviction that arises out of the 
same criminal episode involving the same victim. 
Defendants would have us insert words in the statute 
which simply are not there. In doing so, they would require 
us to ignore that Congress specifically commanded that the 
enhancement would apply to "any" crime of violence 
without regard to temporal considerations. 
 
Just as the Supreme Court in Deal declined to 
differentiate between convictions embodied in separate 
judgments and those embodied in separate charges in the 
same indictment, so also we cannot distinguish between 
criminal acts that occur over a period of time and/or affect 
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various victims and those that result from the same course 
of criminal activity and involve one victim. The Deal Court 
was unequivocal in holding that under § 924(c)(1) 
"conviction" means "the finding of guilt by a judge or jury 
that necessarily precedes the entry of a final judgment of 
conviction," and that more than one "conviction" can occur 
in a single proceeding. Id. at 131-32. The Court stated: "The 
present statute . . . does not use the term `offense,' so it 
cannot possibly be said that it requires a criminal act after 
the first conviction. What it requires is a conviction after the 
first conviction. There is utterly no ambiguity in that . . . ." 
Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
 Those circuits that have had occasion to interpret 
§ 924(c)(1) after Deal have uniformly required the imposition 
of twenty-year consecutive sentences for second and 
subsequent convictions on multiple counts of § 924(c)(1) 
notwithstanding a factual nexus between the predicate 
offenses. In United States v. Floyd, 81 F.3d 1517 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 144 (1996), a case closely 
parallel to this one, defendant Floyd was sentenced to two 
§ 924(c)(1) convictions corresponding to the carjacking of 
the truck of a school principal and the kidnapping of his 
(Floyd's) stepson from that school. Floyd challenged the 
consecutive § 924(c)(1) sentences as duplicative on the 
ground that the carjacking and kidnapping were "a single, 
continuous event." Id. at 1526-27. The court held that the 
consecutive sentences were not duplicative because each 
conviction required proof of an additional fact not required 
by the other under the test articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932). See id. 
 
Similarly, in United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552, 558 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1890 (1996), the court 
rejected a challenge to a § 924(c)(1) enhancement for a 
second conviction in a case where the underlying offenses 
of murder and manslaughter occurred "virtually 
simultaneously," as part of the same criminal episode. And 
in United States v. Camps, 32 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1118 (1995), the court, faced with a 
defendant intricately involved in a violent drug conspiracy, 
upheld separate § 924(c)(1) convictions with consecutive 
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terms of five, twenty, and twenty years arising out of a 
series of acts committed on separate days, all of which were 
part of the same scheme to preserve this drug operation 
from a rival gang. 
 
Casiano and DeJesus do not dispute that under the 
Blockburger test carjacking and kidnapping are distinct 
predicate offenses but they attempt to distinguish Floyd 
and Andrews on the ground that those cases involved 
multiple victims. They point to no language in § 924(c)(1) or 
in Deal's interpretation of § 924(c)(1) that would support 
such a distinction, nor do they offer a principled reason for 
us to treat that difference as significant. 
 
It is unquestionable that crimes occurring as part of the 
same underlying occurrence may constitute separate 
predicate offenses if properly charged as separate crimes. 
See United States v. Fontanilla, 842 F.2d 1257, 1258-59 
(9th Cir. 1988). It follows that each may be a separate 
predicate for a § 924(c)(1) conviction, as the court held in 
Andrews, 75 F.3d at 558. 
 
Indeed, in United States v. Torres, 862 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 
1988), this court sustained convictions on two § 924(c)(1) 
counts that arose out of the same episode on the same day. 
Torres sought to protect his confederates who were being 
arrested for distribution of cocaine on the street by 
brandishing a firearm at the arresting officer. He was 
convicted of the predicate offenses of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and assaulting a federal officer, as well 
as two § 924(c)(1) offenses, i.e., use of afirearm during a 
drug trafficking crime (count 4) and use of afirearm in 
connection with an assault on a federal officer (count 5). We 
held that "the section 924(c)(1) convictions were proper 
under both counts 4 and 5." Id. at 1032. This alone stands 
as circuit precedent compelling rejection of the argument of 
Casiano and DeJesus, as not only did the two § 924(c)(1) 
convictions in Torres arise out of the same criminal episode, 
they arose out of the same act, unlike the facts in this case. 
 
It is true, as defendants note, that in Torres the 
government stipulated that only one sentence could be 
imposed in that case where there were two violations of 
§ 924(c)(1). See id. However, the Torres decision came down 
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before Deal and we accepted the government's concession 
without comment. It is therefore not controlling here, and 
to the extent it may be interpreted as contrary to Deal, it is 
superseded by Deal. See United States v. Luskin, 926 F.2d 
372, 378 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 
Although there may be some force in defendants' 
argument that the enhanced penalty under § 924(c)(1) 
serves little purpose in a case where the predicate acts 
occur simultaneously and where there is not time for 
defendants to reflect and understand the consequences of 
a "second" conviction, we agree with the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits that the Supreme Court's unambiguous definition 
of "second or subsequent conviction" in Deal compels our 
holding. That Court specifically rejected a similar argument, 
stating: 
 
      We choose to follow the language of the statute, 
     which gives no indication that punishment of those 
     who fail to learn the "lesson" of prior conviction or of 
     prior punishment is the sole purpose of § 924(c)(1), to 
     the exclusion of other penal goals such as taking 
     repeat offenders off the streets for especially long 
     periods, or simply visiting society's retribution upon 
     repeat offenders more severely. 
 
Deal, 508 U.S. at 136. The fact that "section 924 sentences 
can produce anomalous results and will provide no 
additional deterrence . . . cannot defeat the plain language 
of the statute." Andrews, 75 F.3d at 558. 
 
Being bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
§ 924(c)(1) in Deal, we will affirm the district court's 
§ 924(c)(1) enhancements. It is for Congress to ameliorate 
the result of application of the statute according to its 
terms, if it deems it too harsh. 
 
